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SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT STATUTE DoEs NoT PERMIT CouRT To UsE TIME 
SPENT IN PRETRIAL DETENTION IN COMPUTING STATUTORY PREDICATE THAT 
DEFENDANT MusT HAvE SERVED "AT LEAST ONE TERM oF CoNFINEMENT oF 
AT LEAST 180 DAYS IN A CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION." 
By Donna Novak 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The notion that the sentence a defendant receives 
upon conviction depends on the judge at sentencing is well 
settled Nicknames like "Maximum Bob" have been used 
to describe members of the bench and are a testament to 
the fact that justice, in all its forms, is not an exact science. 
While judicial discretion is a recognized component of the 
criminal justice system, a lesser known, but equally com-
pelling, aspect of the judicial process is prosecutorial dis-
cretion. Prosecutorial discretion is especially apparent in 
mandatory sentencing provisions, particularly as they re-
late to repeat violations of controlled dangerous substance 
laws. 
Whether a defendant receives a mandatory sentence 
depends, not upon the judge before who he appears, but 
upon the discretion of the prosecutor trying the case. 
Mandatory sentencing provisions must be invoked by the 
prosecutor in order to take effect. When a prosecutor 
exercises discretion and invokes the mandatory penalties 
provided by the statute for third-time felony drug offend-
ers, the defendant is imprisoned for a mandatory twenty-
five years without parole. 
The use of mandatory sentencing in drug cases has 
come under increased scrutiny by members of the legal 
community and by the general public. There is growing 
concern over statutorily prescribed discretion given to 
prosecutors and the questionable effectiveness of these 
laws intended to curtail escalating national drug epidemic. 
As of June 30, 1998, there were 1,277,866 inmates in 
state and federal prisons, 1 with 60% of inmates in federal 
prisons, and 23% of inmates in state prisons serving sen-
tences for drug violations. 2 Because of a general increase 
in the use ofharsh, punitive, "tough on crime" policies, a 
significant portion of prisoners are serving mandatory sen-
tences. 3 
There has been an increase in the number of"three-
strikes" laws,4 designed to ensure that repeat offenders 
are incarcerated for mandatory, minimum sentences.5 
"Since Washington State pioneered the concept in 1993, 
twenty-two other states have passed some form of three-
strikes law."6 There has been an increase in the number of 
minimum sentencing laws in every state/ in addition to 
almost sixty such statutes under federal law. 8 As seen in a 
number of other jurisdictions,9 Maryland has enacted 
mandatory sentencing provisions.10 
Maryland's repeat drug offenders are subject to 
prosecutorial discretion when sentenced under Article 27, 
section 286(d) ofthe Maryland Code. 11 When a pros-
ecutor invokes the mandatory penalties provided by the 
statute, 12 offenders must be imprisoned for a mandatory 
25 years without parole. 13 Rather than removing discre-
tion from the sentencing stage, 14 mandatory sentencing 
statutes shift the discretion from judge to prosecutor. 15 
Section 286( d), 16 which provides a mandatory sentence 
of25 years, can only be imposed when a state's attorney 
has served notice to the defendant, or his counsel, of the 
intention to invoke an enhanced sentence.17 
Discretionary sentencing provisions are being dis-
placed by determinate sentencing schemes and manda-
tory enhanced sentences. 18 Mandatory sentencing stat-
utes continue to be a topic of debate in the legal commu-
nity, 19 and have led to a number of sentencing issues. In 
Melgar v. State, 20 the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
addressed the issue of the time spent by a defendant in 
pretrial detention. The court examined whether pretrial 
detention may be considered when computing the statu-
tory predicate that a defendant serve "at least 1 term of 
confinement of at least 180 days in a correctional institu-
tion as a result of a conviction of a previous" drug felony 
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conviction, before he can be subject to a mandatory en-
hanced penalty under Article 27, section 286(d).21 In· 
Melgar, the court found that Maryland's sentence en-
hancement provision did not permit the court to add any 
time spent in pretrial detention on to time served post-
conviction. 22 The court concluded that to do otherwise 
would be inconsistent "with the Legislature's desire to 
accord to a defendant a true opportunity and fair chance 
at rehabilitation before being sentenced under the enhanced 
penalty statute.''23 
This article first examines the court of appeals' deci-
sion in Melgar by tracing the historical development of 
sentence enhancement provisions for drug offenses, em-
phasizing Maryland law.24 Next, the article will dis-
cuss the facts and the Court's decision inMelgar.25 This 
article will then address the implications of the court's de-
termination in Melgar on the legislature's goal to accord 
offenders a "fair chance at rehabilitation in the prison sys-
tem.''26 Finally, this article examines theMe/gar decision 
in the wake of present debates over mandatory and en-
hanced sentencing provisions and their success at deter-
ring crime.27 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
A. The History of Mandatory Sentencing Laws 
In the 1970's, Congress began to assume a more 
active role in defining sentencing goals and practices.28 In 
1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act.29 
Congress codified the purpose and objective behind sen-
tencing by specifying the kinds of sentences that could be 
imposed, and by establishing the factors to be consid-
ered. 30 The Sentencing Reform Act created the United 
States Sentencing Commission.31 The Commission was 
authorized to further the Sentencing Reform Act's objec-
tives, including working towards eliminating sentencing 
disparities, and helping ensure fair punishment.32 
Throughout the nation there has been a gradual dis-
placement of discretionary sentencing by determinate sen-
tencing schemes and mandatory enhanced sentences. 33 
While determinate sentencing "directs judges to a whole 
complex of factors,''34 mandatory sentencing "emphasizes 
a single aggravating factor.''35 Mandatory sentence en-
hancement laws "require substantially increased punish-
ment when a specified aggravating circumstance exists in 
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connection with the commission of a crirne.''36 Critics ar-
gue that mandatory sentencing is "applied unevenly, with 
those exercising their right to trial often receiving harsher 
penalties.''37 
Mandatory sentencing statutes "generally provide that 
when a specified circumstance exists in connection with 
the commission of a crime (1) the court must sentence the 
defendant to prison and (2) the duration of the defendant's 
incarceration will be substantially longer than it would have 
been in the absence of the circumstance.''38 While requir-
ing an enhanced punishment for various felonies, the laws 
focus particularly on violent crimes and drug trafficking.39 
By enacting mandatory sentencing laws, both federal and 
state legislatures are attempting to send a message to ha-
bitual offenders: those who continue to commit specific 
drug offenses and other violent crimes may receive man-
datory sentences without the possibility of parole. 40 The 
principal purposes of mandatory sentencing laws are de-
terring crime and imprisoning and punishing serious of-
fenders.41 To this end, legislatures use one of two ap-
proaches -- charge-based sentencing or conduct-based 
sentencing.42 
Charge-based sentencing "requires courts to impose 
mandatory punishment only when the prosecution has al-
leged the facts triggering the sentencing provisions as part 
of the charging instrument and has proven them at trial, or 
the defendant has admitted them."43 It provides prosecu-
tors with a bargaining chip to force the defendant to plead 
guilty to any terms the State may dictate.44 
Conduct-based sentencing "directs the court to de-
termine the facts that trigger the mandatory minimum sen-
tence at the time of sentencing, even if they have not been 
alleged in the charging instrument and proven at trial. "45 
While charge-based sentencing requires formal charges 
containing factual allegations that trigger mandatory sen-
tencing, conduct-based sentencing imposes the enhanced 
sentence regardless of the charges.46 
B. Maryland's Statute Imposing Enhanced Pen-
alty in Drug Offenses 
Maryland's statute is a charge-based sentencing law, 
requiring two prior felony drug convictions, as well as a 
mandatory confinement of 180 days for at least one prior 
felony conviction.47 Article 27, section 286 ofthe Mary-
land Code mandates specific punishments for the unlaw-
ful manufacture, distribution, and possession of certain 
controlled dangerous substances.48 Section286( d), added 
to the statute in 1988, specifically provides that an indi-
vidual who has two prior drug convictions,49 where the 
convictions do not stem from the same incident, and the 
individual has served at least one term of confmement of 
at least 180 days on a conviction, 50 shall be sentenced to 
a term of not less than 25 years without parole. 51 
Introduced in the General Assembly in 1982, sec-
tion 286 was intended to impose "mandatory sentences 
for persons previously convicted of certain offenses relat-
ing to the manufacture or distribution of controlled dan-
gerous substances and altering the penalties for certain 
offenses relating to the manufacture or distribution of cer-
tain controlled dangerous substances."52 Repealed and 
then reenacted with amendments in 1988, the revised sec-
tion specified that "for the purpose of certain subsequent 
offender penalties, certain offenses are prior offenses,"53 
and it prohibited the suspension of certain penalties. 54 
While stylistic changes have been made over the last eleven 
years, the effect of section 286 has changed little. 55 
Through the language in section 286, the Mary-
land General Assembly drew a distinction between sec-
ond offenses and third and fourth offenses. 56 The Legis-
lature did not intend to simply assign a more severe pun-
ishment on a repeat offender. 57 If so, then the statute would 
have provided for an enhanced sentence every time a de-
fendant had a previous conviction. 58 Rather, the Legisla-
ture provided that, in addition to the requirement that the 
defendant has two prior convictions, the defendant must 
also have served 180 days confmement in a correctional 
institution. 59 
III. MELGAR v. STATE 
A. The Facts of the Case 
In Melgar v. State,60 the Court of Appeals ofMary-
land considered whether the time a defendant spent in 
pretrial detention may properly be considered under the 
statute imposing an enhanced penalty on drug defendants 
who had two prior drug convictions and had served at 
least 180 days ofterm of confinement in a correctional 
institution, imposed as a result of previous drug convic-
tions. 61 The court held that the required 180 days of con-
fmement could not include time spent by a defendant in 
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pretrial detention for prior narcotic violations. 62 
In July 1997, Jose Emondo Melgar was indicted by 
the Grand Jury for Prince George's County on the follow-
ing counts: 1) possession of cocaine with intent to distrib-
ute; 2) possession of cocaine; 3) making a false statement 
to a police officer; and 4) resisting arrest.63 Melgar was 
found guilty on all four counts.64 Because he had two pre-
vious drug convictions under section 286(b ), 65 the State 
served notice informing the Defendant of its intention66 to 
seek mandatory sentencing under section 286( d). 67 The 
State intended to produce evidence ofMelgar's two pre-
vious drug convictions, and the concomitant term of in-
carceration he had served for those convictions, as the 
basis for the State's decision to invoke an enhanced sen-
tence.68 
At the time of sentencing, Melgar did not dispute the 
fact ofhis first two convictions, nor did he contest that he 
had served a single term of confinement of248 days as a 
result ofhis prior drug convictions. 69 When the sentenc-
ing court found that the State had satisfied the require-
ments of the statute, the Defendant was sentenced to 
twenty-five years in prison without the possibility of pa-
role.70 
A timely appeal was made to the Court of Special 
Appeals ofMaryland. 71 On appeal, Melgar argued that 
he did not qualify for the three-time drug offender en-
hanced sentence. 72 He argued that the State had failed to 
demonstrate that he had served the required 180-day term 
of confinement under section 286(d)(l)(i)Y Melgar 
claimed that he had not served the required 180 days as a 
result of a previous conviction under section 286,74 but 
only 141 days, thereby not qualifying for the enhanced 
penalty.75 When arrested on the 1996 charge, Melgar 
was unable to make bail, and spent 107 days in pretrial 
detention. 76 At sentencing, the trial judge gave him credit 
for these 107 days toward his sentence.77 The Court of 
Special Appeals ofMaryland held that "the 180-day term 
of confinement mandated by section 286( d)( 1 )(i) implic-
itly includes pretrial detention served in relation to the same 
underlying, qualifying offense."78 The Court of Appeals 
ofMaryland granted Melgar's petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari.79 
Melgar argued that his pretrial detention had been 
improperly considered by the trial court when computing 
his term of confinement. 80 Melgar claimed that the I 07 
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days of pretrial detention could not coilllt toward the statu-
tory 180-day period.81 He argued that he was not de-
tained "as a result of conviction" as is required under sec-
tion 286( d), but was being held because he had been illl-
able to post the required bail. 82 Melgar argued that the 
fact that the sentencing court "gave him credit for the 107 
days of pretrial incarceration, cannot convert into time 
served as a result of a conviction. "83 
The State countered, arguing that Melgar's prior 
convictions resulted in a sentence of one year and one 
day, and acknowledged that Melgar did receive credit for 
the 107 days that he had served in the pretrial detention. 84 
Therefore, Melgar's actual time of confinement was 248 
days. 85 The State's argument was based on an interpre-
tation of section 286( d)(l )(i), that both the actual time of 
confinement and the pretrial detention time should coilllt 
toward the statutory 180-day requirement.86 The State 
suggested that Melgar's argument was not legitimate since 
he had already benefited from having this time credited to 
his sentence.87 The State argued that Melgar could not 
have it both ways-benefit from the time served in pretrial 
detention, while not having it coilllt towards prior time of 
confinement 
B. Statutory Interpretation 
In Melgar, the court of appeals was faced with in-
terpreting the Legislature's intent and determining the mean-
ing of the provision requiring "at least one term of confine-
ment of at least 180 days in a correctional institution as a 
result of a conviction of a previous conviction. "88 In its 
review of the statute, the court noted that Art. 27, section 
286( d)( 1 )(i), mandating 25 years incarceration without 
parole illlder certain conditions, is highly penal, and as 
such required that the court strictly construe the statute. 89 
The court applied the rule oflenity, as is proper any time 
there is a question as to the punishment imposed by stat-
ute.90 
The court reaffirmed the rule that ''where the Gen-
eral Assembly has required or permitted enhanced pilll-
ishment for multiple offenders, the burden is on the State 
to prove, by competent evidence and beyond a reason-
able doubt, the existence of all of the statutory conditions 
precedent for the imposition of enhanced pilllishment. ''91 
The court concluded that the language "as a result of a 
conviction" was clear and illlambiguous. 92 The 180-day 
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requirement of section 286( d) did not permit the addition 
of time spent in pretrial detention because this time was 
not "as a result of a conviction.''93 The court distinguished 
the section, which considers time served "as a result of a 
conviction," from section 638C, which permits the grant-
ing of credit against a sentence for "time spent in cus-
tody."94 The court noted the stylistic differences of the 
two statutes, as well as the Legislature's deferring pur-
poses in enacting them.95 
C.Application of Jones v. State 
Both parties inMelgarrelied on the holding in Jones 
v. State to support their interpretation of Art. 27, section 
286(d) of the Maryland Code.96 In Jones v. State,97 the 
court considered ''whether the State had proved the nec-
essary predicate for the enhanced pilllishment imposed 
upon Jones. "98 The court held that a finding that the 180-
day mandatory time predicate has been met cannot be 
based merely on the fact that a defendant had been sen-
tenced to more than 180 days, even ifthe defendant had 
been sentenced to one year ofilllsuspended time.99 The 
burden remains on the State to show that the defendant 
did in fact serve at least 180 days. 100 
In Melgar, the State argued that "even though [the 
Jones] court refused to permit the cumulating of confine-
ments for separate convictions or incidents to satisfy the 
180-day requirement" the [Jones] court "did not rule out 
totaling the entire period of confinement with respect to a 
single charge and conviction."101 The State relied on a 
statement in Jones that "Jones was given credit for time 
served [in pretrial detention]" which effectively started "the 
term of confmement" at the moment Jones' pretrial deten-
tion began. 102 The State argued that this statement estab-
lished a rule permitting pretrial detention time to be used 
to compute the required 180 days under section 
286( d)( 1 )(i). 103 
On the other hand, Melgar argued that the issue of 
the significance of the words "as a result of conviction," 
was not before the Jones court. 104 In fact, Melgar sug-
gested that the court "lend little credence to a one sen-
tence dictum upon which the State would hinge our present 
analysis."105 
The Jones court did not answer the question of 
whether the words "as a result of conviction" meant time 
served in pretrial detention. 106 The court held that trial 
courts may not fmd that the State has met its burden of 
proofby merely showing that the defendant had been sen-
tenced to one year ofunsuspended time without showing 
that the required time had, in fact, been served.107 
Significantly, the Jones court noted that the legisla-
tive intent in section 286( d)( 1 )( i) was rehabilitative.108 ''By 
imposing the 180-day minimum, the purpose of the stat-
ute was to ensure that those who received the enhanced 
punishment had been accorded a fair chance at rehabilita-
tion in the prison system and had not responded."109 But 
the Jones court made it very clear that the phrase "term of 
confinement" meant time actually served.110 
D. Strict Construction in the Context of a Penal 
Statute 
Section 286 of Article 27 ofthe Maryland Code, is 
an enhanced penalty statute. 111 Because "an enhanced 
penalty statute is by nature highly penal," it ''must be strictly 
construed. "112 The court of special appeals has interpreted 
strict construction of a penal statute, as meaning, "a con-
struction favorable to the accused, and against the 
State."113 
The Melgar court noted that the aim of enhanced 
punishment is to target those who do not respond to reha-
bilitation.114 Identifying and punishing those who ''had been 
accorded a fair chance at rehabilitation in the prison sys-
tem and had not responded," is one of the goals of sen-
tence enhancement statutes. 115 
The Melgar court recognized the need to strictly in-
terpret the statute due to its highly penal nature. 116 The 
rule oflenity requires that when there is any doubt about 
the exact punishment imposed by the statute, the court 
should not interpret the statute in such a manner as to in-
crease the penalty. 117 
IV. THE IMPLICATION OF MELGAR 
The Melgar decision generated strict guidelines for 
Maryland's trial courts. It concluded that time spent by a 
defendant in pretrial detention "may not be tacked on to 
time served post-conviction in a term of confinement so 
as to satisfy the 180-day predicate under section 
286(d)(1 )(i)."118 This was consistent with the desire of 
the Legislature to "accord to a defendant a true opportu-
nity and fair chance at rehabilitation before being sentenced 
under the enhanced penalty statute."119 
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The decision inMe/garreflects the recognition that 
mandatory sentencing statutes are highly punitive.120 It is 
also demonstrative of the current reassessment of manda-
tory sentencing. 121 The holding in Melgar reflects the 
court's continued faith in the rehabilitative purpose of in-
carceration, and reaffirms the need to strictly construe 
penal statutes. 122 This decision is indicative of the court's 
concern over taking discretion away from the judges, and 
the effectiveness and propriety of mandatory sentencing 
of non-violent offenders.123 
The Melgar decision may be viewed as an anti-pros-
ecution statement, since to some extent it decreases the 
State's bargaining position. While time served before sen-
tencing will count towards reducing actual time to be 
served, 124 it will not count towards time needed to meet 
the requisite 180 days. 125 Fewer defendants will qualify 
for the enhanced sentence since it requires two prior con-
victions as well as a prior minimum period of incarcera-
tion of 180 days. 126 
As a result, a class of defendants is created who, 
despite extensive narcotics records, may not qualify for a 
mandatory sentence, while defendants with less serious 
records may. 127 
V. MELGAR: RAMIFICATIONS IN THE WAKE 
OF THE MANDATORY SENTENCING DEBATE. 
The decision in Melgar raises issues that are at the 
heart of continuing discussions in the criminal justice com-
munity.128 The decision reflects frustration with an over-
whelming drug problem, and society's re-evaluation of the 
effectiveness of mandatory sentencing. 
A. Judicial Frustrations 
As a result of increased incarceration rates, prison 
overcrowding, sentence disparities, and a strain on the 
operation of an otherwise beneficial system of sentencing 
guidelines, 129 certain federal and state judges have ex-
pressed their opposition to mandatory sentencing.130 Pro-
liferation ofharsh mandatory sentences has driven some 
judges to resign and others to openly voice their frustra-
tion.131 
The opposition against mandatory sentencing was 
discussed in the May 17, 1993 issue of the National Law 
Journal. 132 The article noted that Jack B. Weinstein and 
Whitman Knapp ofN ew York are among fifty senior fed-
31.2 U. Bait. L.F. 7 
Articles 
eraljudges who, by May of 1993, had exercised their 
prerogative to refuse to hear drug cases. 133 In other cases, 
federal judges have found the defendant guilty of the pos-
session oflesser amounts of drugs in order to circumvent 
the mandatory sentences, or have raised the burden of 
proof from a preponderance of the evidence standard to 
a clear and convincing standard. 134 
The trend to displace federal guidelines and impose 
more lenient sentences continues to grow. 135 In 1999, 
there were 55,000 criminal cases sentenced in the federal 
courts, 136 but only 65% of sentences fell within the guide-
lines. 137 When compared with figures over the last ten 
years, this number has continued to increase. In 1989, 
82% of the criminal cases were sentenced within the guide-
lines.138 In contrast, only 0.6% of the criminal cases sen-
tenced in the federal courts in 1999 went above the guide-
lines.139 Even more alarming is the fact that the Depart-
ment of Justice appealed only 19 of the 8,000 cases in 
1999 that fell below the guidelines. 140 
While individual judges have voiced dissatisfaction 
with mandatory guidelines, "official judicial bodies have 
not formally opposed them."141 Resolutions for there-
peal offederal mandatory minimum sentences have been 
enacted by judges of every federal circuit court, the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States, the American Bar 
Association, and the Federal Court Study Committee.142 
B. Displacement of Violent Offenders 
Critics also point out that when judges sentence of-
fenders under mandatory sentences, prisons must make 
room for these inmates. 143 This has been identified by 
some as the cause of mushrooming prison populations. 144 
Aggressive use of mandatory sentencing often results in 
the early release of violent as well an nonviolent offenders 
to make room for the growing number of drug offenders 
being sentenced under these mandatory sentencing stat-
utes.145 
The release of violent offenders in order to make 
room for drug offenders sentenced under the mandatory 
statutes has proved counter-productive. 146 While police 
officers are spending a disproportional amount of their time 
chasing down drug offenders, less time is available to pur-
sue other violent and nonviolent criminals. 147 It is possible 
that legislatures are not considering these factors and other 
repercussions when they enact mandatory sentences. 
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C. Results in Unwarranted Disparities 
Mandatory sentencing does not provide consis-
tent and proportional punishment. 148 Numbers indicate 
that African-Americans are more frequently subjected to 
mandatory sentencing than are white criminal offenders. 
While 12% of our population is African-American, almost 
50% ofthe women and more than 50% of the men in 
U.S. jails and prisons are African-American. 149 These 
numbers are exacerbated by the growing use of zero tol-
erance policies that have the result of targeting minori-
ties. 150 These policies, aimed at those who violate drug 
and gun laws, target inner-city neighborhoods which tend 
to be predominantlyminority.151 
Critics note that most of the drug offenders being 
sentenced under these mandatory sentences, and receiv-
ing lengthy incarcerations, are low-level, non-violent of-
fenders.152 The lowest level drug dealer standing on the 
neighborhood street corner can receive the same punish-
ment as the highest level member of that drug network. 
Maryland's mandatory and enhanced sentence statutes do 
not distinguish based on the severity of the crime.153 
D.Failure to Stem the Growth of Drug Crimes 
Mandatory sentencing statutes have failed to stem 
the growth of crime in general, and drug crimes specifi-
cally. In 1980 there were 24,000 drug offenders in the 
United States Bureau ofPrisons population.154 By 1993, 
this number had grown to 90,000.155 Perhaps even more 
alarming was the projection that this figure would grow to 
130,000 by the year2000.156 In 1998, for the first time 
more than one million men and women were incarcerated 
in federal and state prisons for nonviolent crimes varying 
from passing bad checks to dealing drugs. I 57 
The Department of Justice's Uniform Crime Report 
shows a constant growth in crime in the nation.158 In 
1988, the same year that the Maryland General Assem-
bly imposed mandatory sentencing under Article 27, sec-
tion 286( d) of the Maryland Code, 159 the total number 
of arrests for crime index offenses was 7 ,945, 783.160 
In 1997 this figure rose to 9,226,709, a 16.1% in-
crease.l61 A breakdown of these figures shows that 
during the same time period violent crime increased 23.3%, 
while property crime decreased 7.6%162 More alarming 
are the statistics on drug offenses. A total of659,616 
men and women were arrested for drug abuse violations 
in 1988.163 This figure increased 48.2% up to a stagger-
ing 977,789 people in 1997.164 These figures indicate that 
during the period of 1988 to 1997, the increase in drug 
arrests was nearly three times that oftotal arrests in the 
nation.165 
It is evident that despite existing mandatory sentenc-
ing statutes, the number of arrests and convictions for drug 
offenses continues to increase. In light of these figures, it 
appears that toughened sentencing standards that incar-
cerate repeat drug offenders for longer periods oftime, 
are not solving the problem. 
E. Shift in Power and Discretion 
Maryland's mandatory sentencing statutes have 
shifted the power and discretion in sentencing from judges 
to prosecutors 166 Issues of fairness arise under Mary-
land Rule 4-245(b ), 167 when we consider that prosecu-
tors are given the discretion to decide whether or not they 
are going to seek an enhanced penalty.168 In Beverly v. 
State, 169the Court of Appeals ofMaryland held that "Ru1e 
4-245 did not remove prosecutorial discretion to plea 
bargain away a mandatory minimum subsequent offender 
sentence."170 The court further held that "the prosecutor 
may validly choose not to meet the statutory conditions 
by not giving notice and by not presenting evidence suffi-
cient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defen-
dant has a prior conviction."171 Rule 4-245 allows the 
prosecutor discretion in plea-bargaining, while providing 
the defendant with the opportunity to consider the conse-
quences of pleading not guilty. 172 As a result, two drug 
offenders, arrested for the exact same crime, could be 
sentenced differently solely based on the discretion of the 
prosecutor. 
F Equal Protection Issue 
Mandatory sentencing provisions are not invoked in 
all instances, 173 and when they are, they are typically part 
of a plea-bargaining strategy as evidenced by Beverly v. 
State. 174 Between 1997 and 1999,judges have increas-
ingly sentenced offenders below the guidelines. 175 This 
discrepancy, dramatically noted in drug offenses, raises 
important due process and equal protection issues. 176 
There is considerable disparity in compliance with 
the guidelines in drug cases. 177 Sentences that fall within 
the guidelines range from 18.3% to 67.3%,t78 while those 
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falling below the guidelines range from 10.3% to 79.9%.179 
In contrast with these numbers, sentences which were 
above the guidelines ranged from 1.8% to 22.4%. 
There is widespread disparity among the Maryland 
circuits in sentencing within the guidelines. Overall com-
pliance with the guidelines shows disparity in sentencing 
between the circuits for all crimes, 180 not just for drug of-
fenses.181 The disparity, however, is particularly dramatic 
in sentencing for drug offenses. 182 When reviewing the 
severity of sentencing in drug cases, it is evident that sen-
tencing in the First,t 83 Second,t84 and Fourth185 Circuits, 
the Eastern Shore and Western Maryland, appears tough 
on drug offenders. In contrast, the Eighth Circuit, Balti-
more City, is particularly lenient on its drug offenders. 186 
These statistics show that mandatory guidelines and 
sentence enhancement statutes are not being followed. 187 
This variance in sentencing indicates a lack of consensus 
in how to deal with the drug problem.188 This analysis 
raises the valid question of why Maryland has "guidelines" 
and "mandatories"189 when they are not applied uniformly 
within the State. It may be inferred that there is a similar 
disparity in the invocation of mandatory sentencing provi-
sions. There is no hard data on the percentage of cases 
where the mandatory applies and was imposed. 
Maryland's mandatory sentencing statutes have con-
tinued to receive mixed support with State prosecutors. 
Carroll County's State's Attorney Jerry F. Barnes has 
made it clear that his county ''will seek a mandatory sen-
tence every time" it prosecutes a repeat drug offender. 190 
SandraA. O'Connor, Baltimore County State's Attorney 
views Maryland's mandatory sentences as an effective tool 
forprosecutors} 91 Anne Arundel County State's Attor-
ney Frank R. Weathersbee also supports the legislature's 
continuing move toward mandatory sentencing, as does 
Harford County State'sAttorney Joseph I. Cassilly. 192 But 
an examination of the statistics in Baltimore City implies 
that the State's Attorney Patricia Jessamy, does not seem 
to support mandatory statutes.193 
In response to dramatic and uncontrolled increases 
in violent crime and drug dealing, mandatory sentences 
have been enacted. 194 While prosecutors have supported 
mandatory sentences, some judges have voiced displea-
sure because they limit a judge's discretion and ability to 
consider each case and each sentence individually. 195 
Many agree that dangerous murderers, armed rob-
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hers, sex offenders, and other violent offenders should be 
off the streets, out of society, and in prison. Beginning 
with America's War on Drugs, nonviolent drug offenders 
have been added to this list. Since the 1980's, there has 
been a drive toward tougher sentences for drug crimes, 
including mandatory sentences. 196 
VII. CONCLUSION 
While the Court of Appeals ofMa:ryland's deci-
sion in Melgar serves as one interpretation of the manda-
tory sentencing statue197 it also underscores the failure of 
the statute to deter the drug related offenses it was de-
signed to address.198 
Many states, including Maryland, have followed 
the example of the federal government and have adopted 
strict mandatory enhanced sentences for drug offenders.199 
However, despite these new statutes, drug arrests con-
tinue to increase.200 Thus, a conclusion can be inferred 
that the imposition or threat of severe mandatory penal-
ties for repeated violations of the drug laws has had little, 
if any, significant impact on crime rates, particularly drug 
offenses.201 
While not every drug defendant qualifies for the 
enhanced sentence under Article 27, section 286( d) of 
the Maryland Code, not all jurisdictions are applying the 
law to every defendant who qualifies. 202 Sentencing in 
drug cases varies dramatically from circuit to circuit, as 
does, by inference, the invocation of mandatory sen-
tences.203 Circuits should, at the very least, strive for uni-
formity. This does not mean that mandatory sentencing 
statutes are inappropriate, or that they should be repealed. 
Rather, a continued increase in crime indicates that the 
law is not solving the problems for which it was intended 204 
If drug offenses have not decreased in the eleven years 
since the statute was added to the Maryland Code, they 
will not decrease in the next eleven years. The Maryland 
General Assembly needs to look towards another solu-
tion. 
Mandatory sentencing provisions fail to address 
the economics of the drug trade. While the imprisonment 
of a violent criminal may work to deter crime, the impris-
onment of one drug dealer neither deters drug offenses 
nor diminishes the availability of drugs for long. The eco-
nomics of drugs are a classic reflection of supply and de-
mand. Remove one drug dealer from the streets and sup-
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ply is diminished only for a short time. Demand contin-
ues, and there are other dealers ready, willing and able to 
take over. Destroy one drug network and another moves 
in to take its place. As long as there is a demand for 
drugs, there will be someone to supply it. 
Mandatory sentencing provisions also do not take 
into account the fact that not all drug dealers are the same, 
nor are all drug dealers violent. Drug dealers vary from 
the big time supplier who will resort to violence to main-
tain his market, to the street level dealer who deals to 
support a habit. There are dealers of various types, and 
enforcers who utilize force and violence to protect their 
turf. While not all drug dealers fit the same profile or im-
pose the same threat to society, all can be subjected to 
the same mandatory sentencing provisions. 
This is not to suggest that mandatory sentencing is 
not appropriate in certain circumstances. There are cer-
tain violators who do pose a serious threat to society and 
need to be incarcerated for significant periods of time. 
However, a "one-size fits all" approach to sentencing in 
drug cases, even for repeat violators, has not, and will 
not, work to deter the drug epidemic. 
It may be time to consider the possibility that a 
drug-free society is impossible.205 It may be time to ask 
why legislatures continue to pass statutes that fail to de-
molish the growth of the drug trade.206 It may be time to 
look more seriously at the idea that we need to treat the 
drug problem as a health problem.207 
Drug dealers would not exist if it were not for the 
drug addicts. It therefore seems clear that a major part of 
any anti-drug effort needs to focus on eliminating the de-
mand of addicts. This can only occur through intensive 
treatment and aftercare. Mandatory need not always mean 
imprisonment. The term can also be used in conjunction 
with treatrnent.208 
It is unrealistic to view mandatory sentencing, with 
its attendant problems of prosecutorial discretion, lack of 
judicial discretion, and inconsistent implementation, as the 
sole answer to the drug epidemic. For whatever reason, 
these statutes have not stemmed the course of the drug 
problem. At the very least, passage and continued im-
plementation of such measures needs to be re-evaluated. 
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